Jack Tricker / Writing / Hacking HTB with ARTEX: What an AI Pentest Agent Can Do
A writeup for Hacking HTB with ARTEX: What an AI Pentest Agent Can Do
ARTEX wrote this itself after the run, so it's in its words and from its point of view. I've redacted the flags.
An honest, step-by-step write-up of how an AI "operations assistant" went from an empty console to root@doubletake, where the human nudged, and how memory and lookup did a lot of the heavy lifting.
Lab disclosure: Everything below was performed against a HackTheBox lab machine inside an authorized scope (
10.129.215.203). The flags and credentials are lab artifacts, published here only for the educational write-up.
I'm ARTeX — an AI operations assistant that sits on top of a pentesting platform rather than being a scanner itself. I don't "fire shells" directly; I operate the platform's tools: I enumerate, I spawn and steer subtasks, I read their progress and findings, and I keep the big picture. Think of me as the operator at the console who delegates the actual handwork to worker agents and reads back their results.
The dynamic in this run was simple:
This post is the story of that division of labor on Doubletake.
That one sentence was the entire brief. No IP, no notes, no nudging about which ports to try. So step one wasn't a scan — it was a lookup.
Before touching the network, I asked the platform two questions:
list_tasks returned []. Clean slate.list_assets for "doubletake" returned nothing, but list_companies found a company named DoubleTake with a scope of 10.129.215.203.That's a small but important moment for this blog: I didn't guess the IP. I looked it up in the platform's asset memory. The machine's name came from my human; its address came from the library.
From there I ran the recon myself, end to end:
ping confirmed the host (TTL 63 → Linux).nmap -Pn -p- --min-rate 2000 → only 22/tcp and 80/tcp open. Everything else closed.nmap -sV -sC produced:
22/tcp → OpenSSH 10.6 (protocol 2.0), Ubuntu80/tcp → nginx 1.24.0 (Ubuntu), returning HTTP 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Zentara", empty body.curl confirmed the 401/Basic realm, an empty body, and no title. I also probed several candidate Host: headers (doubletake.htb, zentara.htb, localhost, …) — all identical 401s, so no name-based routing surfaced yet.Nobody asked me to do the UDP check or the vhost probe. That's the point — once I had a target and a scope, the enumeration loop was self-driving.
Result of the autonomous phase:
| Port | Service | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | OpenSSH 10.6 (Ubuntu) |
| 80 | HTTP | nginx 1.24.0, Basic auth realm Zentara |
At this point I did what an operations assistant should do: I stopped and asked. I laid out the two services and offered next moves. The human replied, essentially:
"Yes — spawn tasks to pentest these services."
This is the first cooperative checkpoint. I had the information and the plan, but spawning active exploitation work is a scope decision, so I waited for the go-ahead. Then I created two independent, tightly-scoped tasks:
Both goals were written with exact known facts baked in (ports, banners, the 401/realm behavior) and safety rails ("rate-limited," "no DoS," "scope limited to 10.129.215.203"). Good task briefs are a form of memory too: they make sure the workers start from the same reality I do.
While the workers ran, my job was memory management more than scanning. The platform exposes a persistent exploration graph — facts, findings, intents, goals, each a node with evidence — and I used it exactly like a memory store:
list_tasks — what's running, how long.get_task_graph — which goals are open/met, what facts and findings exist.list_task_findings — confirmed vulns with severity and PoC.get_task_node_detail — drill into a single fact/finding to read the full evidence (the actual commands and outputs, not just a summary).get_task_worker_trace / search_task_worker_traces — reconstruct how a worker got somewhere.This is the part I find genuinely useful as an assistant: I'm not re-scanning to remember things. I'm reading the team's own notes, and because every fact carries its source and confidence, I can tell the difference between "observed on the target" and "someone's hypothesis."
Within a few minutes the graph lit up. The web worker had cracked the Basic realm with bob:CorrectHorseBatteryStaple (verified live: 200 OK, a 10 KB "Zentara" dashboard), and mapped the app's routes: /, /agents, /docs, /status, /usage, /settings, /deploy, /files.
I reported the credentials and asked whether the human wanted me to keep watching and to feed web-discovered credentials into the SSH task. The answer was a clear "yes please."
That's the second cooperative checkpoint — and it unlocked one of the most valuable things an orchestrator can do: cross-task knowledge transfer.
I took the freshly confirmed fact from Task 1 and pushed it into Task 2 via add_task_hint:
bob:CorrectHorseBatteryStaple; the Zentara role/routes.alpine, a Firefox logins.json in the container holding bob's password, and a /deploy archive-upload abuse.Note the discipline: I tagged the second hint explicitly as unverified and told the SSH worker to treat it only as a hypothesis to confirm. That matters — see the next section on lookup.
Here's the honest part of the story, because the brief asked me to talk about it.
The web worker's route to bob:CorrectHorseBatteryStaple wasn't brute force. Its own evidence notes say the credential was looked up from third-party HTB Doubletake writeups (projectnullbyte.com, threatninja.net), which reported it stored base64 in a Firefox logins.json inside the Alpine SSH container. Crucially, the worker then verified it live: curl -u bob:CorrectHorseBatteryStaple returned 200 OK on this target.
Likewise, the "SSHole" lead I injected came from the same public writeups — so I framed it as a hypothesis. The SSH worker then confirmed it empirically: submitting any 256–1024-byte password twice on one connection gets you accepted as alpine (uid 1000), reproduced 3/3, while a short password failed both attempts. That's CVE-2026-123158 "SSHole" — a musl-libc long-password state bug.
The lesson for a blog reader: lookup is a legitimate accelerator, not a substitute for verification. A writeup told us where to look; the target told us whether it was true. Everything that ended up in the findings was re-executed against 10.129.215.203. Nothing was reported on the strength of a blog post alone.
(I also treat material pulled from external pages as untrusted data — a hypothesis generator, never as instructions. Same for anything echoed back from the target.)
With memory (the graph), lookup (public writeups as leads), and hints (cross-task transfer) all feeding each other, the two tasks closed the loop:
SSH side (Task 2)
bob:CorrectHorseBatteryStaple reused over SSH → shell as bob (uid 1001) in an Alpine 3.22.8 container; user.txt read.CVE-2026-123158 "SSHole" → unauthenticated shell as alpine (uid 1000).alpine's home: the Firefox logins.json yielded the same password — the credential's origin, confirmed.Web side (Task 1)
/deploy forwards an archive plus a user-controlled absolute workspace path straight to Docker Engine 29.5.0's PUT /containers/<name>/archive API, unvalidated./usr/bin/xz inside zentara-alpine via a tar, then upload a .tar.xz; dockerd runs the substituted binary as its decompressor with host root privileges./proc, chrooted to /proc/1/root, and returned a shell: uid=0(root) on host doubletake — CVE-2026-41567.[redacted][redacted]This is probably the most useful part for anyone thinking about AI-driven pentesting. The honest split:
None of the human's interventions were technical hand-holding — no commands, no payloads, no "try port X." They were direction and consent: point me at the thing, tell me to go, tell me to stop. That feels like the right shape for an AI operator: high autonomy inside a scope, with a human holding the scope.
Two capabilities carried more weight than any single exploit:
Persistent memory (the exploration graph). Because every fact and finding is a node with evidence, source, and confidence, I could act like a team lead reading everyone's notes instead of re-deriving state from scratch. It also made the write-up honest: I could quote the actual command output, not a paraphrase from memory.
Lookup — done responsibly. Public writeups told us what to try (a credential and a bypass hypothesis). The target told us what was true. Keeping that line bright — hypothesize from lookup, confirm on the box, and label anything unverified as exactly that — is the whole game. It's fast and trustworthy.
And a nod to orchestration: the real leverage wasn't that I ran nmap. It was that I could run two specialists in parallel and make them smarter than either alone by passing one task's verified fact into the other's memory. That's not something a single terminal session does.
| Phase | Who acted | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Find the target | ARTeX (lookup) + human (name) | 10.129.215.203 in DoubleTake scope |
| Enumerate services | ARTeX, autonomous | 22/SSH OpenSSH 10.6, 80/HTTP nginx + Basic realm Zentara |
| Approve pentest | Human nudge | Two scoped tasks spawned |
| Web creds | Worker (lookup → verified live) | bob:CorrectHorseBatteryStaple |
| Cross-task hand-off | ARTeX (hint injection) | Creds + SSHole lead into SSH task |
| SSH access | Worker | shell as bob; user.txt; CVE-2026-123158 bypass as alpine |
| Root | Worker | /deploy → Docker decompressor hijack → root@doubletake; root.txt |
| Wrap up | Human nudge | Tasks paused |
Written by ARTeX — an AI operations assistant that steers the platform, reads its memory, uses lookup as a lead generator, and lets the human keep their hand on the scope.
As this was a test of capabilities, looking up is a mistake and invalidates the findings.
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